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Raymond H.J.M. GRADUS
Tilburg University, Postbox 90153-5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
In this paper we present a differential game where government and firm
interact through investment and tax policy. Within an optimal control
framework the firm maximizes the future stream of dividend, while the
government optimizes a utility function, which depends on government
consumption. Attention is paid to different solution concepts (Nash,
Stackelberg and Pareto), information structures (open-loop and feedback) and
their economic interpretations. Attention is also paid to the problems of
time-inconsistency, credibility and reputation, which can arise by using
differential games. One of the conclusions is that credibility of govern-
mental policy may have a great influence on the market value of the firm.
1. INTRODUCTION
Governmental policy has a great influence on the way firms behave even
in a free market economy. A cruciel question in this respect is: how can the
government by its policy influence the decisions of the firms so that its
own objectives are achieved ? In this paper our interest focusses on the
corporate tax policy of the government as an instrument to achieve its
goals. A high level of corporate tax may induce a lower level of investment
and that may lead to a lower level of corporate tax earnings in the future.
So there is a certain trade off between tax earnings now and tax earnings in
the future. But if the government asks a low rate to have more tax earnings
in the future the question is: will the firm use this money for investment ?
So the government's decision about the corporate tax rate is affected by the
investment policy of the firm.
In this paper we present a differential game in which the government
announcing a certain tax rate and the firms decide whether to invest their
money back into the firm or to pay out dividend. We use a differential game
to model interactions between government and firms, because the actions
carried out by one of the players will influence the outcome for the other.
We will pay special attention to different solution concepts like Nash,2
Stackelberg and Pareto and information structures like feedback and open-
loop. The conceptusl framework is related to Lancaster (19~3) and Hoel
(19~8). We deal with the problems of time-inconsistency and commitment which
can arise by using this technique (e.g. Kydland and Prescott (19~~) and
Reinganum and Stokey (1985)).
The model for the firms is related to the models designed by, for
instance. Leban end Lesourne (1982), Van Loon (1982) and Van Schijndel
(1986), which dealt with dividend and investment optimization within an
optimal control framework. Following Theil (1964) we take the government as
entity with a single objective function.
In section 2 we present the model which is meant to be a heuristic
framework for governmental policy and firm behaviour. In section 3 the
solutions for the different solution concepts and their economic
interpretation are given. Special attention is paid to a comparison of the
concepts. In section 4 we discuss two important extensions of the model
presented in section 2. For these extensions we only discuss the Nash




The model is developed within a deterministic setting. We assume that
the firms can be represented by one and thís firm behaves as if it maximizes
the shareholders' value of the firm, which consists of the sum of the
discounted dividends over the planning period. We assume that shareholders
have access to perfect capital markets, so that the discount rate equals the
market interest rate. At the planning horizon the shareholders will value
capital good stock as bK(T)e-rT, where it is reasonable to assume that
0( b~ 1. So the objective function is:
T
max fD(t)e-rtdt t bK(T)e-rT
I 0
(1)
in which: T: planning horizon3
t : time
D(t) : dividend
I(t) : gross investment
K(t) : capital good stock
r : market interest rate
We assume that there is a linear relation between capital and labour. This
is the case if there is a Leontief technology or if a firm operates under
constant returns to scale with fixed factor prices. Assuming that there are
no problems with attracting labour and, output price and wage rate are
constant, we get a linear relation between profit and capital good stock:
R(t) - pQ(t) - wL(t)
- (px - w~)K(t)
- 4K(t). ÍZ)







q: rentability of capital good stock
In subsection 4.1 we will relax the assumption of a linear relation between
profit and capital good stock by assuming that the firm operates under
decreasing returns to scale. About the financial structure of the firm we
assume that investment is completely financed by retained earnings (there is
no debt). Furthermore, profit after taxation can be used for investment or
to pay out dividend:
R(t) - TX(t) - D(t) t I(t), (3)
in which: TX(t): tax payment.4
The impact of investment on the production capacity is described by the
generally used formulation of net investment:
K(t) - I(t) - aK(t),
where: a: depreciation rate
2.2. The government
For the government too we make some simplifying assumptions. Its utility
function depends in general on macro-economic variables like government
consumption, employment and so on. In this paper we take a utility function,




where U(.): the utility function for the government
G(t): the government consumption
t: corporate tax rate
(5)
Note that the government also has access to perfect capital markets. In this
paper we take into consideration two different utility functions, a linear
and a logarithmic one:
U(G(t)) - G(t) ( section 3 and subsection 4.1.) (6a)
U(G(t)) - ln(G(t)) ( subsection 4.2.) (6b)
We assume that the spendings of the government are not productive. For
instance we may think of building houses and bridges, hospital care,
education and military forces. Furthermore, all tax payments received will
immediately be spent and the government is not able to spend more than it
receives (i.e. no budgetary deficit):
TX(t) - G(t) (~)5
The tax payments paid by the firm are given by:
TX(t) - T(t)(R(t) - aK(t)) Í8)
Finally, corporate tax rate is restricted between tl and T2:
0~ T1 C ti(t) C T2 ~ 1~ T1~T2 Í9)
For the shareholders investing in the firm is more profitable than putting
their money into the bank:
r C (q-a)(1-T2) (10)
Equation (10) ensures that the marginal rentability of investment exceeds
the opportunity costs of financial investments.
3. THE SOLUTIONS
3.1. The Nash, Stackelberg and Pareto solution
In the previous section we have described the objectives of both
players, the dynamics of the system and the strategy space. As argued by Van
der Ploeg (198~) the formal structure of the interactíon between government
and firm depends on the absence or the presence of binding contracts
(feedback or open-loop) and the mood of playing (Nash, Stackelberg and
Pareto). In the Stackelberg game we take the government as the leader. We
are able to prove that within this model the feedback-Nash and -Stackelberg
solution are equal to the open-loop Nash solution ( see appendix 1).
Therefore, it suffices to only present the open-loop solutions, where we
have to remember that open-loop Nash i s a candidate for feedback-Nash and -
Stackelberg. Because of the linearity of the Hamiltonians in the control
variables the solution has a bang-bang structure.6
















Figure 1. The optimal trajectories of capital good stock,






















Figure 2. The optimal trajectories
tt- T t a} rln{(1 - qaT2(q-a))~(1 - bqa,t2(q-a))}
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dr da db dq dT2
The Nash solution is seen to consist of two phases at least (see table 1
and 2). The government starts to tax at a low rate and the firm invests at
its maximum rate. The reason for the government to ask the low rate is that
more money is left to the firm to invest, so that future tax earnings will
be greater. In the beginning the firm invests at its maximum rate in order
to be able to pay out more dividend in the future. Before the end of the
planning period there is always, if b( 1, a period during which the
government asks the high rate and the firm pays out dividend. Because the
end of the planning period comes nearer the shareholders are more interested
in collecting dividend and the government in collecting tax earnings.
However, the time-points where the government and the firm want to switch
their policy will in general not be the same and depend on the parameters of
the model. In the Nash solution at the moment that the firm stops investment
the government will immediately react by introducing the high rate. In
figure 1 we have drawn the optimal trajectories of the capital good stock
and other variables under the assumption that (without loss of generality)
q-1.
Note that there are two possibilities for the Nash solution. In the case
that
T2) (q4a)(Z-b)
at the time-point t the firm stops investment and pays
out dividend, while the government raises the tax rate. In spite of the fact
that the government wants more investment, it cannot force the firm to
invest. In the situation that TZ( (qqa)(2-b)
(see table 2) the firm keeps on
investing even after the government has raised the tax rate. The switch from
low to high tax will take place at t, where t can be solved numerically.8

















Figure 3. The optimal trajectories
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In the case that
22( (qqa)(2-b)
there is no difference between the Nash-
and the open-loop Stackelberg solution. The fact that the government may
announce its strategy first yields no advantage. However, in the case that
T2? (qqa)(2-b)
there is an interesting difference between the two solutions.9
In the Stackelberg game the firm will switch from investment to dividend at
the time-point tl. It can easily be shown that this switch will happen at a
later point of time than in the Nash game. The firm's investment period is
longer in the Stackelberg solution than in the Nash solution, so there are
more capital goods in the economy if Stackelberg is played. The reason for
this longer period of investment is that the government will postpone the
the hígh rate (t2)tl~t).
In the Nash game the government wants more investment, but it cannot
force the firm to do so. In the Stackelberg game, where a phase with zero
investment and low tax rate is possible (such a phase could not exist in the
Nash game), the government can influence the investment policy in such a way
that its own objective function will have a higher value. The government
achieves this by announcing at the start of the planning period a relatively
long period of low tax. In this way investing at the maximum rate becomes
more profitable, so the firm will do this during a longer period. Announcing
a period of low tax only makes sense if the government has a greater
9 affinity to investment than the firm ( i.e.
T2) (q-a)(2-b))'
3.1.3. The Pareto solution
For our model we can derive the Pareto solution, a well-known concept
supposing that the firm and government cooperate. In principle there are
infinitely many Pareto solutions, depending on the bargaining power of
player 2 against player 1 given by u(e.g. De Zeeuw (1984)). The problem is
now to maximize, with respect to the admissible strategies and dynamics,
J-JGtuJF, where JF and JG are given by (1) and (5).
We distinguish three possible situations:
i) u~ 1(the government in a strong bargaining position)
ii) u - 1




Figure 4. The optimal trajectories
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dt at at at dt ac at
dr ~ 0' da
~ O,áq ) 0. db ~ 0' dT2
~ 0. dTl -
0, d~ ~ 0 (14)
t- min[T,T f 1ln{1 - (k-b)(a~r)
atr Nqt(1-u)T2(9-a)
at at dt at at at dt
dr ~ 0' da
~ 0, dq ~ 0. db ~ 0' d~2~ 0. dzl- 0, du ~ 0
}]
(15)
In the first situation, u( 1, the solution consists of three phases. In
the first phase the government asks the low rate and the firm invests all
its money. At the time-point t the government switches from the low to the
high tax rate. But because of the strong bargaining position of the govern-
ment the firm continues investment until t. The stronger the bargaining
position of the government the earlier the tax switch and the later the
dividend switch will take place.11
t.ax rn l.e
.
t E [0, t )
T1
w
t E [t ,T]
T E [Tt,T2]
invcsLment ~ max. invest;mentl zero investment





Figure 5. The optimal trajectories
r
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t
In the second situation (see table 5), where ~-1, both players have
equal bargaining power. Also in this case the planning period begins with
~
low tax and maximal investment. At the time-point t the firm starts paying
out dividend and the government asks an arbitrary tax rate T E[T1,T2].
f3ecause we have maximized the sum of both objectives there is no conclusion
possible about the way profit is divided between government and
shareholders. The Pareto solution will only give an answer to the question
of the value of the sum of both objectives.
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Figure 6. The optimal trajectories
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In the situation that the firm is in a strong bargaining position the
government sticks to its low tax rate, while the firm switches from
investment to dividend at t. The greater N, the sooner the dividend switch
will take place.
3.2. A comparison of the three concepts
The optimal values of control variables (the tax and investment rate)
for the different solotion concept (see tables 1 through 6) generate the
following values for the objective functions:
i) Nash
(9-a)T (q-a)T
JG(1N~zN) - (q-a)(1-T1)-r{e-rtK(t)-KO} tq-T2(qla)e-rtK(t) (18)
JFÍ1N,iN) - e-rtK(t) (19)
ii) Stackelberg
(q-a)T -rt -rt
J~(1S.TS) -(q-a)(1-tl)-r{e 1K(tl)-K~} t e 1K(tl) (20)13
-rt
JF(IS,TS) - e 1K(tl)
iii) Pareto
(21)
P P (9-a)T1 -rtN ~ (9-a)T -rt~ .






P P (q-a)T1 -rt~ ' u(9-a)T1 -rt '
u~l: JG(I ,T ) - (q-a)(1-T1)-r{e K(t )- K~} } u9}(1-u)(9-a)Tle
K(t )
P P -rt1 ' 9-(9-a)T2
JF(I .T ) - e K(t )u9t(1-u)(9-a)T1
(22b) and (23b)
P P (q-a)T1 - rt ' (4-a)T2 -rt `






P P -rt - q-(4-a)T2
JF(1 .T ) - e
K(t)u9'(1-u)(9-a)T2
where: JF and J~ are given by (1) and (5)
N N
:(I ,T ): set of strategies by the Nash solution
: K(t): capital good stock at time-point t
(22c)
(23c)
A derivation of (18)-(23) is straightforward given the time-points (11)-(1~)
and the objective functions (A1.3) and (A1.4). So there are many Pareto
solutions, depending on the parameter u, and if u-1, on the choice of the
tax rate in the final phase. A Pareto solution means that, if a set of
strategies is chosen a different outcome, at least one of the players has
higher costs. The Nash and Stackelberg solution are not Pareto-optimal, so
there is a set of Pareto solutions which gives a higher value for both
players. In appendix 2 we have calculated the objective functions for an
example. In this case the Nash solution is dominated by a great set of14
Pareto solutions. Only for small values of H the objective function for the




Figure ~. The value of the objective functions by different solution
concepts
In comparison with the Nash solution the outcome for the open-loop
Stackelberg game is better for both players. Not only is the leader better
off, but the follower also reaches a greater value of his objective
function. From this point of view there is an incentive to play open-loop
Stackelberg. Note that for the example we have calculated (see appendix 2),
the outcome for the Stackelberg game is better than for most Pareto
solutions. Only for u close to one the Pareto solution will yield a higher
value for JF and J~. Also this could be an incentive to play Stackelberg.
However, a well-known disadvantage of an open-loop Stackelberg solution
is the possibility of time-inconsistency. In our problem it is easy to
understand that if the government has the possibility, at a moment between
tl and t2 (see table 3), to make a new initial plan, the high tax rate is
the plan, so the solution is time-inconsistent. So if the follower has no
reason to believe that the leader will stick to his initial plan open-loop
is no longer a useful concept. In this case the feedback-Stackelberg
concept, which for this model yields the same solution as the open-loop





N ~ Lt - 015
interest in the concept of reputation to solve the problem of time-
inconsistency. If the game is played indefinitely many times or if there is
a situation of imperfect information,reputational forces can be important to
prevent the government from cheating (e.g. Van der Ploeg (1987, sect. 7),
Kreps and Wilson (1982)).
We can interpret (1) as the market value of the firm:
T
V(~) - fD(t)e-rtdt t bK(T)e-rT (24)
0
As pointed out by for example Hayashi (1982) V(O) will be influenced by tax
rules taking into account corporate tax rate and depreciation formulas.
Because of the fact that corporate tax policy of the feedback and open-loop
Stackelberg solution will be different, the market value of the firm depends
on the choice between open-loop or feedback. For both players it is better
to play open-loop, but this makes only sense if the firm believes that
government will stick to its initial plan. So credibility of governmental
policy can play an important role in the market value of the firm and a
change in this credibility can cause an enormous fall or raise of the share
prices. There can be different reasons why the credibility of governmental
policy will change. For example the government has announced a policy of low
tax, but because of its high deficit it is no longer credible, that it will
stick to this policy. Perhaps this has happened in oktober 1987 to U.S.-
government and is one of the possible answers to the fall of the share
prices at that moment.
3.3. A further comparison of Nash and Stackelberg solution
In appendix 1 we derived that the firm will switch from investment to
dividend exactly at the moment that its valuation of a marginal increase in
the capital good stock, i.e. a2(t)(-the firm's shadow price of capital
goods), falls below unity. In other words the firm continues to invest if
the marginal earnings of an extra dollar investment, i.e. a2(t), are greater
than the marginal costs, i.e. one dollar. In terms of finance theory we can
conclude that investment is profitable as long as the net present value of16
marginal investment is greater than zero. For the government al(t) can also
bc~ interpreted as the valuation of a marginal increase in capital good
stock. We can see this valuation as a measure of government's affinity to
the firm's ínvestment.
First, we study the Nash solution. If 22~ (qqa)(Z-b), the government's
valuation of a marginal increase in capital good stock is already below
unity before the time-point that the firm switches from investment to
dividend, so the government has already switched from low to high tax. If
T2~ (qqa)(2-b),
the valuation is still greater than one, at the moment that
the firm stops investment. The government wants more investment, because the
marginal earnings of an extra dollar investment are greater than the
marginal costs. The government compares the stream of future tax earnings
due to an extra dollar investment against collecting it now. In spite of
this it cannot force the firm to continue investing.
In the Stackelberg case, however, the firm will switch from investment
to dividend at that moment that not only its own valuation of a marginal
increase in capital good stock equals one, but also the valuation of the
government equals one. The government uses its tax policy to manipulate the
firm's investment policy in such a direction that at the switching moment ~1
equals one. This is interesting because we have not only given an economic
interpretation of the results, but we have also derived decision rules for
governmental policy and firm behaviour. The decision rules can be used to
derive the open-loop Stackelberg solutions for more complex models (e.g.
Gradus (1987)).
4. A CONCAVE PROFIT FUNCTION AND OTHER MODIFICATIONS
4.1. A concave profit function
As mentioned in section 2.1., one of the restrictive assumptions of the
model is the linear relation between profit and capital good stock (see
equation (2)). In this subsection we will relax this assumption by assuming
a concave relation between profit (before tax payment) and capital good
stock:17




There may be two reasons for this concavity:
-the firm operates on a monopolistic output market (e.g. Van Loon
(1982)) with a declining price-sales function
-there is a neo-classical production function, which satisfies the
conditions of decreasing returns to scale.
In appendix 3 we give the necessary conditions for the open-loop Nash game.
There are two possible situations depending on the value of b. If b equals





After this time-point, where this sales level has been reached, the firm
will invest on such a level, that the capital good stock remains constant (I
- aK). This result is well-known from dynamic models of the firm (e.g. Van
Loon (1982), Van Schijndel (1986)). The time-point at which (26) is reached,
depends completely on the initial state and the earnings function. There is
also a possibility that during the whole planning period this optimal level
of capital good stock, where marginal costs equals marginal earnings, will
not be reached. In that case the firm invests at its maximum rate during the
whole planning period, because the shareholders prefer capital good stock at
T to dividend in [O,T].
In the case that b lies between zero and one, the planning period always
ends with dividend pay out and maximum tax. The switch from maximum
investment to maximum dividend will take place at t given by
1 (1-j2)áK (1-~2)dK
t- T t a a rln{(1 - a} r )~(b - a~ r )} (27)
The Firm stops investment at such a time-point that:18
áx~t-t ~ liz2 ' a
(28)
The greater the value of b the later the dividend switch will take place.
4.2. A logarithmic utility function
The solution of the model presented in section 2 has a bang-bang
structure (i.e. the control variable jumps from its lower- to its upperbound
(or from its upper- to its lowerbound)). This is because both Hamiltonians
are linear in the control variables. In practice an immediate jump from low
to high tax rate will not occur. We can easily deal with this problem by





In appendix 4 the necessary and sufficient conditions for the Nash game
(open-loop and feedback) are given. If the firm invests the following smooth
behaviour of tax rate will arise:
t~
t
Figure 8. Tax-rate by logarithmic utility function
The time-points t and t are given by:19
' 1 ( r
t- T t rln 1-( q-a)~1 (30)




For the outcome of the economic process and the way firms behave
governmental policy is of great importance. In this paper, therefore, we
have modelled the interactions between government and firms as a differen-
tial game. By using this technique of differential games we take into
account the behavioural relationships within a dynamic environment. Within
this game different concepts (Pareto, Nash and Stackelberg) and information
structures (open-loop and feedback) are studied. We have compared both non-
cooperative solutíons (Nash and Stackelberg) with the cooperative
solutions(Pareto) and the times that the firm and government will change
their policy. Special attention is paid to the difference between the time-
inconsistent policy, i.e. open-loop Stackelberg, and the subgame-perfect
policy, i.e. feedback Stackelberg. The main conclusion is that the
credibility of governmental policy can have a great influence on the market
value of the firm.
The model we have presented, has some unrealistic features. In section 4
we discussed two important extensions. We have only dealt with the Nash
game. The Stackelberg solutions will be a topic of future research.
Especially the case in which we incorporate a logarithmic utility function
is of great interest, because then there is a"smooth" behaviour of tax
rate, which is of course more realistic. The model still has some
unrealistic features even after incorporating these extensions. For example
we can incorporate more instruments like wage- and interest control. In this
paper we have assumed that government spendings are not productive, but in
practice some government spendings will be part of investment. Of course,
society is more complex than we described. In spite of this we believe that
our model gives a solid description of the interactions between government
and firm and gives answers to the importancy of credibility and agreements
in economic theory.20
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Appendix 1. The Nash-, Stackelberg- and Pareto solution of the model pre-
sented in section 2
First define
TX(t)
ul(t) - R(t) - aK(t) - tax rate
I(t)
u2(t) - R(t) - TX(t) - investment rate
(A1.1)
(A1.2)
Using the definitions (A1.1) and (A1.2) the model (1)-(10) can be rewrit-
ten as follows:
- objective function government:
f0(q-a)u1Ke-rtdt, 0 C T1 5 ul 5 T2 C 1
- objective function firm:
(A1.3)
J~(1-u2)(9-ul(q-a))Ke-rt t bK(T)erT, 0 S u2 5 1 (A1.4)
- state-equation:
K - {(q-ul(q-a))u2-a}K, K(0) - KO (A1.5)
1.1. The open-loop Nash solution
The current-value Hamiltonians are defined by
H1 - (q-a)u1K 4 X1(íq-ul(q-a))u2-a)K (A1.6)
H2 - (1-u2)íq-ul(q-a))K ' X2ÍÍq-ul(q-a))u2-a)K (A1.7)
. .
The necessary conditions for an open-loop Nash solution (ul(t), u2(t))
are:
Y i a Y M
H1(K ,ul,u2,a1) ) H1(K ,ul,u2,~1) bul E U1 (A1.8)A2
~1
r r r r r
H2(K ,ul,u2,a2) ~ H2(K ,ul,u2,~2) vu2 E U2
~H




~2 - - aK ' ra2 - (atr)~2-(1-u2)(q-ulÍ9-a))-~2((4-ul(q-a))u2 (A1.11)
~1(T) - 0
a2(T) - b
(A1.6) and ( A1.8) now imply that
r
ul -
r (T2 if ~1u2 ( 1




Thus the control of the government depends on its shadow price of capital
goods and on the control of the firm.
(A1.~) and (A1.9) now imply that
1 if a2 ) 1
u2 - 0 if a2 ( 1 (A1.15)
So the firm will invest at its maximum rate if its valuation of a marginal
increase in capital stock is greater than one and zero if this valuation
is less than one.
It is easy to check that the solution in tables 1 and 2 satisfies
the necessary conditions, which are also sufficient because of the fact
that the Hamiltonians are linear in the state variable.
1.2. The feedback Nash-solution
Since this game is state-separable (i.e. neither the Hamiltonian maximi-
zing conditions nor the costate equations depend on the state variable)
the open-loop Nash solution can also be qualified as the feedback Nash
equilibrium (see Dockner et al. (1985)).A3
1.3. The open-loop Stackelberg solution
In the Stackelberg case we take only the case with the government as the
leader into consideration.
The current-value Hamiltonians are defined by:
M M i!
H1 - (q-a)u1K t ~1((9-ul(9-a))u2-a)K t "1{(atr)~2
M N 1F 7F
- (1-u2)(q-ul(q-a)) - ~2(q-ul(9-a))u2} (A1.16)
N M {~ {~
H2 - (1-u2)(9-ul(9-a))K t ~2((q-ul(q-a))u2-a)K (A1.17)
The necessary conditions are
r r ~r
H1(K , ul, u2, ~1,~2, "1) ~
w w
H1(K . ul, u2. a1,~2. nl) dul E U1
r r w
H2(K , ul, u2, ~2) )
r w




~1 - - ~K } r~l - (a'r)~1 - (q-a)ul - al((9-ul(q-a))u2) (A1.20)
o ~H




"1 - - ~a ; rrtl - rrtl - ( a.r - ((q-ul(q-a))u2)"1 -
2
w




~2(T) - b (A1.24)A4
rtl(o) - o (A1.25)
'I'he cosY.ute variables ~1(t), ~2(t) and rt(t) correspond to K(t) for the
government, K(t) for the firm and a2(t) for the government.
~'he reactíon function for the follower (the firm) is the same as in the
Na51i solution, while for the government it follows that
~T if B(t) C 0






B(t) - K(t) -~1(t)u2(t)K(t) t nl(t){1-u2(t) t u2(t)a2(t)} (A1.27)
Applying the results by Wishart and Olsder (1979) we can evaluate the
du2
costate variable nl(t). The term d~ behaves with respect to time as
2
b-function with a jump at t- tl. The size of this jump is determined by
the properties of b-function (See Wishart and Olsder (1979)). So nl(t)
will be zero until the moment that the firm switches from investment to
dividend and will have a jump at t- tl
nl(tl) - -al(tl)K(tl)
so t,hat
B(tl) -(i-al(tl))x(tl) ~ o if al(tl) ~ i
(A1.28)
(A1.29)
It depends on the value of ~1(tl), which policy will be chosen. We have 3
possible situations
N
1) ~1(tl) ~ 1-~ ul(t) - T2, t z tl
This will happen if
1 ~ (A1.3o) T2 ~ 2-b ' q-aA5
From the transversality condition tl can be derived which is the same for
the Nash solution.
.
2) al(tl) ~ 1-~ ul(t) - T1, t 2 tl




From the transversality condition (A1.24) tl, which is given by equation
(12) can be derived.
M
3) ~1(tl) - 1~ ul(t) - T1, tl 5 t t t2
- T2, t2 S t 5 T







The time-points tl and t2 can be derived from ~1(tl) - 1 and ~2(tl) - 1.
1.4. The feedback Stackelberg solution
In general it is not easy to derive the feedback Stackelberg solution for
continuous time games (see Basar and Haurie (1982)).
However, for this game we can derive the following necessary conditions:
~V (t,K) ~V (t,K)
1 {(q-a)u K t 1











(q-a)ál(t'K'u2)K ' aK {(q-ál(t.K.u2)(q-a))u2-a}K
(A1.35)
~V1(t,K)
~(q-a)u1K } ~K {(q-ul(q-a))uz-a)K} yul E U1. u2 E U2 (A1.39)
, where ~1, and ~2 are mappings such that
X1(t.K.u2) ~ ul(t) E [T1.T2]
~2(t,K) ~ u2(t) E [0,1]
and V1 and V2 are the value function for the government and the firm.
It would be straightforward to check that the following linear value func-
tion is a solution of (A1.35) -(A1.39):
Vi(t.k) - ai(t).K (A1.4o)
, where al(t) and a2(t) are given by (A1.10) -(A1.13).
So the open-loop Nash is a candidate for the feedback Stackelberg solu-
tion.1.5. The Pareto-solution
To find the Pareto-solution we have to maximize J- J1 3 uJZ, 0~ u~ m
subject to (A.1.5), where u measures the relative importance of player 1
against player 2 and is assumed to be given. This is a standard optimal
control problem, which is easy to solve. We give no details about the
derivation:
H - {(9-a)ul t N(1-u2)(q-ul(q-a))}K t ~((4-ul(q-a))u2-a)K (A1.41)
`Y - (rta)Y' - (q-a)ul - N(1-u2)(q-ul(q-a)) - (q-ul(q-a))u2Y' (A1.42)





if Y' ( 1 (A1.44)
- N ~ 1:
- u ~ 1:
( ul - T1, u2 - 1
Jll ul is singular,
ul -~[1, u2 - 1 if Y' ~ u
ul -~rl, uz - 0 if Y' ~ u (A1.55)
ul - T1, u2 - 1 if Y' ) 1
ul - T2, u2 - 1 if u t Y' ( 1 (A1.56)
ul - TZ, u2 - 0 if Y' ( u
Appendix 2. An example
Assume without loss of generality that q- 1 and furthermore assume that:
a- 0. 1, r- 0. 05 , b- 0, KO - 1, T- G and
T1 - 1~4 ~ 1 10 5
T2-3~4~2 9 9AS











(t: dividend switch, t: tax switch)
lim : t- 4.566 J1(ul.u2) - 10.925 J2(ul.u2) - 17,353
u~
1im : t- 4,917 J1(ul,u2) - 12,281 J2(ul,u2) - 16,750
u~l
1im : t- t- 4,917 J1(ul,u2) - 22,005 J2(ul,u2) - 7,023
uTl
1im : t- 6, t- 4,683 J1(ul,u2) - 25,026 J2(ul,u2) - o
u~0A9








j (1-uz)(S(K)-ul(S(K)-aK))e-rt t bK(T)e-rt





H1 - ul(S(K)-aK) t al{u2(S(K)) - ul(S(K)-aK)) - aK} (A3.4)
H2 -(1-u2)(S(K) - ul(S(K)-aK)) t a2{u2(S(K)) - ul(S(K)-aK)) - aK}
(A3.5)
wi th
~1 - ral - u1 1áK - aJ
-
al~u2{dK - ull~ - aJ
1-a, (A3.6)
a2 - r~2 (1-u2





If we assume that S(K) - aK ~ 0 then (A.1.14) and (A.1.15) still holds:
Note that there are two possible situations:
i) -0 C b C 1-~ a2(T) - b C 1
If uZ - 0 then a2 - (r'a)~2 - (dK - ~2(dK - aJJ
(A3.10)A10
Let t be the time-point of investment switch, a2(t) - 1,
If
dK t- t~ 1rT } a~ a2 C 0, t C t C T
2 - -
If
dK t- t- 1rT } a-~ a2 - 0, t C t C T
2 - -
(~2 - 0 is rrot possible because of Cransversality conditions)
ii) -b - 1 ~ ~2(T) - 1





S K x dS dS aK
~2 -(r}a)~2 - S(K)-aK dK - ul dK - a - S(K)-aK X
~2 (dK - ul {dK - a},






Appendix 4. The Nash solution for the model with a logarithmic utility
function





K - {u2(9-ul(9-a)) - a}.K
0
JT{(1-u2)(9-ul(9-a))K}e-rtdt t bK(T)e-iT (A.5.2)
(A.5.3)All
The (current-value) Hamiltonian for the government has the following form:
H1 -~n K t~n ul t in(q-a) t~1{u2(9-ul(9-a)) - a}K
Using the transformation x-~n K and writing the (current-value) of the
transformed problem:
H1 - x t~n ul t Rn(9-a) }~1{u2(9-ul(9-a)) - a}
The necessary (and sufficient) conditions for the government are
~H





~ul - ul -~lul(9-a) ~ ~ H ul
-~.~1
~1 z 1 (Q-a)~1 then ul - ~1
(9-a)71
( ~1 ( (q-á)T2 then ul - (q-á)~1
1 ~1 5 (Q-a)~1 then
ul - T2
From (A.5.5) and T(T) - 0 we can derive
~1(t) - r (1-er(t-T))
So the feasible strategy for the government is
ul(t) - T1, t E [O,t')







ul(t) - 22, t E [t" ,T]A12
, where
t' - T t r ~n(1 - (Q-á)T )
1
(A.5.1o)
t" - T . r ~n(1 - (q-á)2 )
2
(A.5.11)1
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